Mixminion: A next-generation anonymous remailer

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Outline

- Background
- Related systems
- A few improvements over past work
- Secure single-use reply block mechanism

Anonymous, message-based communication

Forward messages, only Alice remains anonymous

• Direct replies, only Bob remains anonymous


 Anonymized reply messages where Alice and Bob remain anonymous

Threat Model (we hope)

- Global passive adversary: can observe all links
- Controls some of the nodes/links
- Can send, modify, delay, etc some messages


We are not real-time, fast, packet-based, or steganographic.

Basic building block: Mix




A mix batches, decrypts, and reorders messages

Multiple Hops



Assume not all hops will collude and reveal A

Fixed length messages by re-padding



 Add random junk to the bottom to replace the info you strip off. Everything's encrypted, so it looks ok.

Reply block



- "bob" = 1, $E_1(2, ..., E_n(B))$
- In Mixminion, replies act like forward messages.

Related systems

- One-hop: Anonymizer, hotmail, etc
- *Low-latency:* onion routing, Freedom
- Remailers: Cypherpunk, Mixmaster, Babel
- Other: flash mix, hybrid mix, provable shuffle, etc

Integrated directory servers Act as reputation servers too

- Mixmaster's *ad hoc* scheme opens users up to partitioning attacks.
- Directory servers can be out of sync; evil DSs can give out rigged subsets to trace clients.
- DSs must successively sign directory bundles; a threshold of servers is assumed good.

Link encryption for forward anonymity

- Mixmaster uses SMTP for transport
- We use TLS over TCP
- Link encryption and short-term keys stop many attacks

Key rotation / Replay prevention

- Mixmaster has no built-in key rotation
- ...and sketchy replay detection mechanism
- Solve them together: we keep hashes of all messages seen since the last key rotation.

Tagging attack on headers

- Mixmaster/Babel headers have a hash to integritycheck that hop. Doesn't check the rest of the header!
- We can flip some bits later in the header. If we own the hop that corresponds to the part we just broke, we can recognize the message.
- So we make the hash cover the entire header.

And payload too... But you can't know the payload when writing a reply block!

- Forward messages want hashes, and replies can't have them.
- If replies are rare relative to forwards, replies are easy to track.

Messages have two headers and a payload

Build a path out of two legs, one for each header

- For forward messages, Alice makes both legs
- For direct replies, Alice can use the reply block directly
- For anonymized replies, Alice makes the first leg and uses Bob's reply block for the second.

Legs are connected by the Crossover Point

 One of the hops in the first header is marked as a crossover point

 At the crossover point, we decrypt the second header with a hash of the payload, and then swap the headers.

Forward messages are anonymous:

- If the second header or the payload are tagged in the first leg, then the second header is unrecoverable.
- If tagged in the second leg, we've already gotten anonymity from the first.

Replies are anonymous:

• The adversary can never recognize his tag.

Multiple-message tagging attacks

 If Alice sends multiple messages along the same path, Mallory can tag some, recognize the pattern at the crossover point, and follow the rest.

• Only works if Mallory owns the crossover point.

 Fix: Alice spreads over k crossover points (and hopes Mallory doesn't own most of them)

Nymservers and single-use reply blocks

- Work like pop/imap servers
- User anonymously sends a bunch of reply blocks to receive the mail that's waiting for him.

Future work

- Dummy traffic policy
- Exit abuse
- Directory servers
- Synchronous batching
- More analysis!

Play with our code

http://mixminion.net/ (Code, mailing list, design, spec)

Do you want to run a server?